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ABSTRACT 
 Android has become the most popular mobile 
operating system. Millions of applications, including 
many malwares, haven been developed for it. Android 
itself evolves constantly with changing features and 
higher complexities. It is challenging for application 
developers to keep up with the changes and maintain the 
compatibility of their apps across Android versions. 
Therefore, there are many challenges for application 
analysis tools to accurately model and analyze app 
behaviors across Android versions. Even though the 
overall system architecture of Android and many APIs are 
documented, many other APIs and implementation details 
are not, not to mention potential bugs and vulnerabilities. 
Techniques and tool supports are thus needed to 
automatically extract information from different versions 
of Android to help programmers understand system 
behaviors and APIs across different versions. This paper 
aims to address the need.  It performs whole-system 
analysis for different versions of Android by using both 
backward and forward static analysis of intra-procedural 
and inter-procedural control-flow and data-flow graphs. It 
can collect information about functions in Android that 
can be invoked by applications, which are referred to as 
publicly accessible functions in this paper. Such 
information can help programmers better understand the 
ways in which their applications utilize system functions. 
We have analyzed Android versions 4.1.1, 4.2.2, 4.3, 
4.4.4, 5.1.0, 6.0.1, and show basic statistics about the 
publicly accessible functions in different Android 
versions. We also use an example to illustrate that the 
information about publicly accessible functions can be 
useful in identifying unprotected system functions whose 
invocations may not be protected by proper permissions 
and may lead to security and privacy violations. 
* This work is done when the first author is a visiting student in the 
School of Information Systems at Singapore Management University. 
KEYWORDS: android, call graph, control flow 
analysis, data flow analysis, program comprehension, 
permission check 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Android now accounts for more than 80% of the 
global smartphone operating system (OS) market [8]. 
There have been more than 8 million mobile application 
programmers worldwide in 2014 [7]. To help 
programmers, especially novice ones, to develop 
applications for a mobile OS quickly, often a first step is 
to get them become familiar with the architecture of the 
mobile OS and all APIs available in the OS. Thus, 
programmers can structure their apps according the ways 
in which the OS manages apps and able to invoke needed 
OS functionalities via the APIs. Even though the overall 
system architecture of Android and many of its APIs are 
documented, many APIs have evolved much across 
different versions of the Android system from API level 1 
to API level 24 for Nougat 7.0, exhibiting different 
behaviors and causing incompatibility across versions and 
inconsistencies between actual code behaviors and the 
documentations. There are also many undocumented APIs 
in the system that could be invoked by apps, not to 
mention many potential bugs and vulnerabilities that can 
be exploited by apps too. 
Understanding system behaviors and APIs becomes 
even more challenging when Android faces the 
fragmentation problem: there are over 1000 brands and 
more than 24000 models of Android phones in 2015 [15]; 
the manufacturers of the brands and models often 
customize the Android system for their phones in different 
ways without sufficient documentations for programmers. 
Manually going through documents and source code to 
track and understand the relations among different system 
APIs and behaviors is very time-consuming and error-
prone; such tasks should be facilitated by tools (e.g., code 
navigation via Android X Ref [6]) that can work across 
different versions and fragments of the system. 
The 11th SEATUC Symposium	
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In the area of static analysis of Android systems and 
applications, much work [4,12,16,19] that focuses on 
analyzing Android applications require expert knowledge 
and models of the Android systems, such as the lifecycle 
callbacks used by the system to manage individual app 
activities [1], the back stack used in the system to manage 
sets of running activities [2], etc. Such expert (and 
manual) modelling of the systems cannot keep up with the 
evolution and fragmentation of the systems, leading to 
inaccurate models and analysis results. So, there are also 
needs to automate the modeling of various versions of the 
Android system, and more generally, to automate the 
modeling of large-scale frameworks and libraries used for 
application development, so that analysis of apps can be 
more accurate. 
The ultimate goal of this work is to achieve automated 
modeling of Android systems and facilitate programmers 
to understand system behaviors and APIs. One way 
towards this goal is to perform whole-program analysis of 
a version of Android together with an application, so as to 
avoid the need to manually construct a behavior model of 
the system before analyzing the app. This way has been 
considered in the literature and comes with many 
challenges (e.g., [18]). 
This paper takes a first step to analyze whole Android 
systems in different versions, to automatically curate 
Android system functions that are accessible by 
applications. It provides a “navigation map” for different 
versions of Android systems for programmers to 
understand what functionalities in different versions of 
Android systems can be invoked by which APIs. 
Technically, we construct Java class hierarchies, call 
graphs and control-flow graphs for different versions of 
Android systems using the Soot analysis framework [17], 
and then identify public functions in Android that can be 
invoked by applications with suitable parameters that can 
be obtained by the applications too. Such curated 
functions can reveal to programmers how system APIs, 
documented or undocumented, can be invoked in 
applications, helping them to understand the capabilities 
of the APIs. We have analyzed six versions of Android: 
4.1.1, 4.2.2, 4.3, 4.4.4, 5.1.0, 6.0.1, and curated publicly 
accessible functions from them. The numbers of publicly 
accessible functions generally increase with increasing 
version numbers and Android code sizes, from about 53K 
to 74K. Together with more analyses (e.g., checking 
whether permissions are added for publicly accessible 
functions to prevent unauthorized accesses), we aim to 
show that curated information about such functions can be 
useful in helping programmers understand system 
functions and revealing unprotected system APIs that may 
lead to security and privacy violations in Android. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 briefly introduces related work; Section 3 describes our 
approach; Section 4 presents our actual setups and 
evaluations, and discusses our limitations and possible 
future work; Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
The work in this paper is closely related to much work 
in static analysis of Android systems and applications. 
Much work that focuses on analyzing Android 
applications require expert knowledge and models of the 
Android systems. 
FlowDroid [4], was introduced in 2014, focuses on 
the private data leaks. It performs static analysis on 
Android app based on inter-procedural control-flow and 
data-flow. As a part of this work, they modeled the effects 
of callbacks by generating a dummy main method. 
As shown by Li et al. [12], IccTA performs inter-
component communication based taint analysis (ICC). 
They used a highly precise control-flow graph through 
instrumentation of the code of applications to detect ICC 
based privacy leaks. 
CHEX [13] detects possible hijack-enabling flows 
through conducting low-overhead reachability tests on 
customized system dependence graphs. They model the 
vulnerabilities from a data-flow analysis perspective. 
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In the study by Yang et al. [19], they presented a 
control-flow representation or user-driven callback 
behavior based on context-sensitive analysis of event 
handlers. They traverse context-compatible inter-
procedural control-flow paths and identify trigger 
callbacks of the statements to perform graph reachability. 
In 2015, Rasthofer et al. [16] described in detail the 
components of current state-of-the-art static and dynamic 
code analysis techniques of Android malware 
development. They emphasize the challenges for 
automatic malware analysis frameworks. These problems 
hinder the fully automatic detection of Android malicious 
components significantly. 
Generally, the effectiveness of such analysis is prone 
to the inaccuracies of the manually constructed models of 
the systems. This paper tries to work towards automated 
modeling of Android systems. 
Thus, a major objective of the work is performed 
whole-program analysis of any version of Android 
system, so as to reduce the need for manually produced 
behavior models before analyzing an application, and to 
make the analysis of the application more accurate. This 
objective on whole-program analysis has been considered 
in the literature. For example, Yan et al. [18] propose to 
extend Soot with summary-based analysis so as to scale 
up to whole-program analysis. StubDroid [3] generates 
summaries for system/library APIs before performing 
data-flow analysis for applications. 
Those studies focus on building summaries and 
models for automated application analyses, not 
application development; their outputs are not intended 
for programmers to read, and may not be useful for 
programmers who are developing applications and want 
to understand system APIs and behavior models better. 
The work on this paper focuses more on the 
understandability of the whole systems, although 
techniques used in other work can be adapted for our 
purposes, and the outputs from our work may be used for 
both application analysis and system analysis, e.g., 
checking proper permission controls in Android systems 
and applications [5,11]. 
 
3. APPROACH 
3.1 Overview 
At a high level, our technical idea is straightforward 
as illustrated in Figure 1 mainly consisting 3 steps. 
(1) For a version of Android, we collect all of its 
code, identify all Java classes involved, construct 
call graphs for the whole Android system from 
the system's main entry point 
(com.android.server.SystemServer). 
(2) Then, we identify potentially publicly accessible 
functions, and use data-flow and control-flow 
analysis based on the call graphs to identify 
objects and other functions that are needed to 
invoke each of the public functions. Such 
analysis will produce information on the 
dependencies among objects and functions and 
indicate possible paths in the code that link the 
dependent elements together. 
(3) To illustrate the usefulness of such information, 
we follow the dependencies and paths to check 
whether publicly accessible functions are 
protected with certain permissions in the Android 
system (e.g., the sample code fragment in Figure 
1 shows that getDeviceId is protected by the 
READ_PHONE_STATE permission), and detect 
possible unprotected system APIs that access 
system or private resources without proper 
permission checking. Such unprotected system 
APIs could be potentially invoked by 
applications without permissions, causing 
security and privacy issues. 
 
Fig 2. The whole-system call graph of Android version 4.4.4	
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3.2 Call Graph Construction 
Statically constructing call graphs of the Android 
system faces many technical challenges, some of which 
are common for all Java programs, other are unique to 
Android. For example, Java reflection is often used to 
invoke dynamically loaded classes and methods whose 
signatures may be difficult to determine without accurate 
string analysis of possible method names. This is a 
common problem handled by the Soot static analysis 
framework [17] to some extends. Android also extensively 
uses event-driven programming and registered listeners to 
invoke various kinds of call backs to process messages. 
And, broadcasts (or, intents) can be sent by both the 
system and applications to each other to invoke different 
functionalities based on intent matching. Android also 
supports defining call backs and intents via XML 
configuration files, which incurs additional challenges for 
accurate static call graph construction. We do not address 
these challenges; instead, we reply on the capabilities of 
Soot to construct the call graphs starting from 
SystemServer.main(). 
Android is a large system was built in many years, 
there is other challenge as the call graph is a huge graph 
(about one million edges and fifty thousand vertices with 
Android version 4.4.4). Figure 2 describes the complexity 
of whole-system call graph Android. It is difficult to load 
the data from call graph to memory and apply the 
pathfinding algorithms. We resolve this problem via 
NetworkX [14] as an intermediate library. It dumps the 
call graph memory to the special format is called Pickle 
to improve the access performance. 
 
3.3 Publicly Accessible Android Functions 
A basic condition for a function in the Android 
system to be publicly accessible is that the function should 
be a public method in Java. Also, the second more 
complex condition is that the objects needed for invoking 
the function should be either publicly accessible too or 
could be constructed easily. To check whether a function 
satisfies the two conditions, we need to recursively check 
whether all involved objects and functions are publicly 
accessible, which is essentially a backward data-flow 
analysis with heuristic filters based on coding and naming 
conventions. 
The following is essentially a backward data-flow 
analysis: 
(1) For objects of primary types, they can be easily 
constructed with random values, and we consider 
them publicly accessible. 
(2) For an object that is a public field in a class, it is 
considered publicly accessible if one of the 
class's constructor and the parameters for the 
constructor are publicly accessible.  
If the object is a private or protected field, it can 
still be publicly accessible when the class has a 
getter function whose name is the same as the 
field name. 
(3) For a public static method that takes in primary 
types as parameters, the method can be easily 
invoked from outside of the Android system with 
randomly generated parameter values. 
(4) Otherwise, we need to check whether it is easy to 
obtain all the objects needed for invoking the 
public method. 
For example, if an object of type T is needed to 
invoke a public function f, then we need to check whether 
one of T's constructor is publicly accessible, or whether 
an instance of T can be returned via some getter 
functions.1 If either the constructor and the getter 
function requires additional parameters to be invoked, 
recursive checks are performed. 
To simplify the analysis and get preliminary results, 
this paper considers a function to be publicly accessible as 
long as it is public. In addition, there are also many 
functions in the Android system (about 38-43%) that are 
not reachable from the SystemServer.main entry. We 
consider such functions are not intended to be invoked by 
the system itself, and are more likely designed for 
applications to use. So, we consider such functions 
publicly accessible as long as they are public. 
 
3.4 Understanding of Android System Functions and 
Checking Permissions 
We consider three kinds of information that may be 
useful in understanding a publicly accessible function if a 
programmer wants to invoke it properly: 
(1) the information about all the dependencies, 
including objects and other functions needed, 
before invoking the function. 
(2) the information about what happens, including 
objects affected and functions invoked, after the 
function is called. 
(3) the information about what happens, including 
objects affected and functions invoked, within 
the function. 
Item (1) can be collected using a backward flow 
analysis that identifies objects and functions that 
programmers need to construct or invoke before invoking 
the function. 
Item (2) can be collected by an impact analysis that 
traverses control and data flows in a forward mode, 
together with an escape analysis and heuristics based on. 
Item (3) can be collected by an impact analysis too, 
but focuses on inner workings of a function and may only 
 
1 E.g., a function named getSomething returns type T. These heuristics 
are neither sound nor complete; they are to simplify the analysis. 
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be needed if programmers want to understand the 
function's internals. Section 4 presents some summarized 
statistics about the collected information. 
As a particular application of such information, we 
can apply it to address a security and privacy question: are 
all the publicly accessible functions that access system 
and/or private resources protected by proper permissions? 
Given a publicly accessible function f: 
(1) if the objects and functions needed before 
invoking f do not have any permission 
protection. 
(2) if the objects and functions within the invocation 
of f do not have any permission protection. 
(3) if the invocation of f can change some external 
objects, then it is very likely f is not properly 
protected by a permission. 
Based on the question mentioned above, we propose 
Algorithm 1 to detect the permission checking issues. This 
algorithm is a backward-flow analysis through the call 
graph paths to get all methods that have permission 
checking. Section 4.2.3 illustrates how such permission 
checking can be done with an example. 
 
 
Algorithm 1. Detect permission checking 
4. EVALUATION 
4.1 Setups 
Our approach uses Soot to generate call graphs of 
Android systems and output them in the Dot file format. 
Then we use NetworkX library [14] to analyze the graphs, 
to traverse call graphs to find paths, analyze in-degrees, 
out-degrees and output graphs into Pickle file. 
For Soot to construct call graphs for a version of 
Android, we feed it with all system jar files (including 
android.jar) in the Android SDK as distributed by 
Google. To analyze the Android system from version 4.1 
to 4.4.4, we used all of jar files in /system/framework 
that extracted from Google Nexus 4 emulator of 
Genymotion tool [9]; these file included Dex file of 
Dalvik Virtual Machine. From version 5.0.0 and later, 
Android changed its architecture, replacing Dalvik Virtual 
Machine (VM) with Android Runtime (ART) and the Dex 
files were combined to Linux binary files (ELF file). 
Since Soot framework did not support Linux binary files, 
we used the Java bytecode of Android from Grepcode [10] 
for Android version 5.1.0 and 6.0.1. 
 
Table 1. The generation time for each version 
Version Generated Duration (seconds) 
4.1.1 31988 
4.2.2 35790 
4.3 41288 
4.4.4 43133 
5.1.0 80463 
6.0.1 86521 
 
The duration to generate and read the call graph files 
is a challenge issue. We generated the call graphs on our 
server with the specifications as Windows Server 2008 R2 
64-bit, Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5540 2.53Ghz, RAM 64 GB. 
Table 1 presents the generated duration for each Android 
version. The generation time in the Dot format is 
approximate 9 hours for version 4.1.1 and up to 24 hours 
for version 6.0.1. Then, it takes about 10 minutes to read 
and convert the Dot file to Pickle via NetworkX, and the 
following graph traversals based on the Pickle files can be 
performed quickly. 
 
4.2 Result Summary 
Our evaluation addresses the following research 
questions: 
(1) How the numbers of total and public methods 
changes for each Android version? 
(2) How are the degree distributions of the methods? 
(3) Could we find publicly accessible functions that 
are not properly protected by permission checks? 
The next sections address each research question in 
detail. 
 
4.2.1 Methods in Each Android Version 
Comparing Android 4.4.4 with 5.1.0 (the gray line in 
Figure 3), the numbers of call graph methods increase 
14.7%. The change rate is comparable between Android 
4.1.1 and 4.4.4. The large change rates indicate the needs 
of tools to help programmers to understand the Android 
Result: Set methods has permission checking
Set setMethods = null;
Stack stackPaths = getCallGraphPaths();
while stackPaths NOT empty do
Path currentPath = stackPaths.pop();
while currentPath NOT empty do
Method startingMethod = currentPath.pop();
if startingMethod HAS permission checking and NOT in setMethods then
setMethods.add(startingMethod);
end
StackStmt stackCallerStmts = locateCallerStatements(startingMethod);
while stackCallerStmts NOT empty do
Stmt callerStmt = stackCallerStmts.pop();
if callerStmt HAS permission checking then
Method callerMethod = callerStmt.getMethod();
setMethods.add(callerMethod);
else
Stack stackRelatedVars = locateRelatedVars(callerStmt);
Stack stackRelatedStmts =
locateStatementsOfRelatedVars(stackRelatedVars);
while stackRelatedStmts NOT empty do
Stmt currentStmt = stackRelatedStmts.pop();
if currentStmt HAS permission checking then
Method currentMethod = currentStmt.getMethod();
setMethods.add(currentMethod);
end
end
end
end
end
end
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system functions. The numbers of edges also change 
significantly (e.g., Android 4.2.2 increased 10.8% and 
4.4.4 increased 11.2%). These changes also contribute to 
the complexity of the Android system after each new 
version. The orange line in Figure 3 presents the number 
of public methods for each Android version. The public 
methods occupy about 51% of all system methods from 
Android 4.1.1 to 4.4.4. After Dalvik VM was replaced by 
ART from Android version 5.0, this ratio changed to 54% 
as our results on Android 5.1.0 and 6.0.1. These ratios 
demonstrate the difference between Dalvik VM 
architecture and ART architecture. 
 
 
Fig 3. Numbers of Methods and Edges 
4.2.2 Degrees of Methods 
We use the interaction degrees among methods in call 
graphs to illustrate the complexity of Android functions. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the in-degree and out-degree 
distributions, respectively, for Android. The distributions 
exhibit power-law like relations, especially for degrees in 
the range of [1, 100]. The degrees in the range of [100, 
10000] are distributed in a more arbitrary fashion. 
Samples of nodes of high in-degrees are toString, append 
methods in the general purpose Java StringBuilder, 
Object classes. More interestingly, nodes of high out-
degree may not indicate high complexities of the involved 
methods. E.g., equals, toString methods in the Android 
core.KeyValueMap, text.SpannableStringBuilder 
classes have almost the highest out-degree, reflecting the 
fact that it deals with generic object types, but the code of 
these functions are often short and easy to understand. 
More complex methods are in fact those having tens of 
out-degrees and dealing with specific object types with 
rich contents, e.g., parseIntent, getLastLocation in the 
Android Intent, LocationManagerService classes. 
 
(a) Android version 4.1.1
 
(b) Android version 5.1.0
 
(c) Android version 6.0.1 
Fig 4. In-degree distributions of Android 
4.2.3 Accessing system resources without permissions 
Information curated by our analysis could be applied 
to find potential security and privacy violations. 
For example, consider the public method 
setStreamVolume() of system class 
com.android.server.audio.AudioService. Based on 
the call graph of Android version 4.3, we realize this 
public method invokes many other methods in the system 
class AudioService in a certain order, such as 
ensureValidStreamType(), getDeviceForStream(), 
rescaleIndex() and finally sendVolumeUpdate(). The 
method sendVolumeUpdate() could update the device 
volume without permission. So, it means the applications 
could access its device volume without any permission. 
This bug was fixed from Android 4.4, Google used 
method 
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AppOpsManager.noteOp()!=AppOpsManager.MODE_ALLOW
ED to check permission before calling rescaleIndex(). 
 
 
(a) Android version 4.1.1
 
(b) Android version 5.1.0
 
(c) Android version 6.0.1 
Fig 5. Out-degree distributions of Android 
4.3 Discussion 
As the example in Section 4.2.3, our technique could 
be used to detect the vulnerabilities of the operating 
system Android. It's also more potential for detecting data 
leaks or support the developer understands Android 
system better. 
Note that directly invoking publicly accessible 
functions in the system is not the only way for Android 
applications to invoke functionalities of the system. There 
are other ways, such as broadcasting an intent that will be 
matched and processed by systems, or using Java 
reflection to invoke functions dynamically, etc. These 
ways of invoking system functions are not yet detected as 
publicly accessible functions in this paper and are left for 
future work. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper takes a first step to analyze the whole 
Android system across various versions, with the intention 
to automate the modeling of system behaviors and 
facilitate more accurate and scalable whole-program 
analysis of Android applications. The work so far focuses 
on providing better understandability of system functions 
that are publicly accessible. Based on limited studies of 
six versions of the Android system from 4.1.1 to 6.0.1, we 
show that system functions change a lot across different 
versions; the numbers of publicly accessible APIs change 
from about 53K to about 74K. Also, the complexity 
involved in many APIs can be high based on their in-
degrees and out-degrees. We also illustrate the potential 
usefulness of the studies by showing missed permission 
checks for a publicly accessible API that may violate 
security and privacy. In the near future, we will integrate 
the API dependencies and control/data-flow information 
into modern IDEs (e.g., Android Studio, Eclipse, IntelliJ 
IDEA) in a visual way to help programmers navigate 
through and understand the complex system APIs, and 
will automate the permission checks for discovering 
unprotected APIs that may lead to security and privacy 
violations. 
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